My phm was to concentrate 40 or 50 battleships at Martinique by movements concerted from Toulon, Cadi'/,, Ferrol, and Brest; then have them return suddenly to Boulogne; get control of the .straits for fifteen days; have 150,000 men and 10,000 horses ready; disembark in England, seize London and the Thames. This plan almost succeeded. Had Admiral Villeneuve, instead of going into Ferrol, merely effected his junction with Lhe Spanish squadron, and made sail for Brest to join Admiral Gan-teaume, my army was over, and there was an end to England. To carry out this plan, it was necessary to collect 150,000 men at Boulogne, a flotilla of 4000 boats, and im-mcnae stores; get all thin on board ship, and yet prevent the enemy from guessing my intentions: this seemed im-possible. If I wan to succeed it was by doing the reverse of what seemed obvious. If /H) ships of the line were going to cover the passage of the army to England, all that we, needed at Boulogne were transports; and the immense display of gunboats and floating batteries of various kinds was absolutely useless. Collecting 40UO vessel* of this sort was opposing cannon to cannon, tship of war to ship of war; and the enemy were taken in, They Iwlieved I intended to force the passage by mean* of the flotilla, and never realised my actual plan. When, after my fleet had failed to carry out its manoeuvre, they perceived the danger they had run, fear *ei %ed on the Cabinet of Ixm-don, arid every thinking man admitted that England hud never been so near tiwiufter,

18th, (To Marshal Ma&nena, commanding in chief the army of Italy, at Valcggio.) You have nearly 80,000 men under your orders; that is one third more than ever I had*